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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper studies how cross-border venture capital investors as opposed to domestic venture capital 
investors influence the development of their portfolio companies. For this purpose, we use a 
longitudinal research design and track sales from the year of initial venture capital investment up to 
seven years after this investment in 692 European technology-based companies. Findings 
demonstrate how companies backed by cross-border venture capital investors initially exhibit lower 
sales growth compared to companies backed by domestic investors. After a couple of years, 
however, companies backed by cross-border investors exhibit higher sales growth compared to 
companies backed by domestic investors. Finally, companies that raise finance from a syndicate 
comprising both domestic and cross-border investors develop into the biggest sales generators. 
Overall, this study provides a more textured understanding of the role played by venture capital 
investors as their portfolio companies develop and thereby require different resources or capabilities 
over time.  
 
Keywords: venture capital, cross-border, international, portfolio company development 
JEL codes: D92; G24; G32; G34 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The venture capital industry has long been a local industry (Cumming and Dai 2010), with 
geographical proximity to investment targets deemed necessary to locate and evaluate these targets 
(Sorenson and Stuart 2001) and to efficiently provide post-investment monitoring and value adding 
services (Mäkelä and Maula 2006). Nevertheless, the last decade has witnessed a strong growth in 
the international flows of venture capital worldwide (Alhorr et al. 2008; Meuleman and Wright 
2011). Driven by increased competition in a maturing industry, venture capital firms have more 
intensively searched for investment opportunities outside their home regions. Researchers have 
started to investigate this phenomenon more closely. So far, scholars have primarily focused on the 
drivers of the venture capital internationalization process at the macro or industry level (e.g., Alhorr 
et al. 2008; Madhavan and Iriyama 2009; Mäkelä and Maula 2005) or conditions and strategies 
deployed by venture capital firms to overcome liabilities of distance and liabilities of foreignness 
(e.g., Bruton et al. 2005; Cumming and MacIntosh 2001; Fritsch and Schilder 2008; Guler and Guillén 
2010; Lu and Hwang 2010; Meuleman and Wright 2011; Pruthi et al. 2003, 2009; Wright et al. 2002).  
Despite increasing interest in the venture capital internationalization process, research on 
the impact of cross-border venture capital investors – defined as investors located in a different 
country from the country where the portfolio company was founded and with no local branch in the 
latter country - on the development of their portfolio companies is scarce and evidence is mixed. 
Cross-border venture capital firms located in a venture’s target market may play a positive role by 
legitimizing the unknown venture in that market (Hursti and Maula 2007; Mäkelä and Maula 2005) or 
by sharing knowledge pertaining to internationalization and international markets, thereby 
contributing to a stronger internationalization of the venture (Fernhaber et al. 2009; Lutz and George 
2010). Yet, cross-border venture capital investors located in another market than the target market 
tend to drive internationalization efforts of the venture towards the investor’s home market with 
sometimes detrimental effects (Mäkelä and Maula 2005). Furthermore, cross-border venture capital 
firms stop active contribution to their portfolio companies much earlier than domestic venture 
capital firms when the prospects of ventures have fallen (Mäkelä and Maula 2006). More recently, 
scholars have demonstrated that while the probability of a successful exit is lower when venture 
capital firms invest in more distant companies, the probability of a successful exit increases when 
distant venture capital firms syndicate with venture capital firms located close to the portfolio 
company (Cumming and Dai 2010; Moser 2010). Venture capital firms may prematurely exit their 
portfolio companies, however, and a successful exit from the perspective of the venture capital firm 
is not necessarily in line with the perspective of entrepreneurs (Gompers 1996).  
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The goal of the current paper is to investigate how young technology-based ventures backed 
by cross-border venture capital firms develop over time and how this relationship is moderated 
when cross-border venture capital investors syndicate with at least one domestic venture capital 
investor.  
We address the call by Zahra and colleagues (2007) to develop a more textured 
understanding of the role played by venture capital firms as their portfolio companies develop and 
draw upon the resource based view of the firm and on stage development theories to build a 
dynamic model on the impact of cross-border venture capital investors upon the development of 
their portfolio companies. For this purpose, we focus on young technology ventures that received 
venture capital from cross-border venture capital investors in the first investment round and 
compare them to ventures that started with domestic venture capital investors only. Given the 
liabilities of newness and the lack of resources that young technology ventures face (Vohora et al. 
2004), a young company in the early phases of its technical and organizational development is more 
likely to require a higher level of involvement by the venture capital firm than a company at a later 
stage (Gupta and Sapienza 1992). We hence hypothesize that ventures backed by domestic venture 
capital investors will initially exhibit higher growth compared to ventures backed by cross-border 
venture capital investors only, as value added from domestic investors will benefit them most in this 
early stage (Lockett et al. 2008). As ventures develop, the international knowledge, networks and 
reputation of cross-border investors will be beneficial to help them internationalize, enabling a 
higher growth in the medium term. We further expect that ventures raising venture capital from 
both domestic and cross-border venture capital investors in a first investment round will exhibit the 
highest growth rates, as they combine the benefits of both domestic and cross-border venture 
capital investors. 
The research population is comprised of European venture capital -backed technology 
ventures. The broad-scale economic integration policies in the European Union and the introduction 
of a single currency in a number of countries have contributed to fastening the internationalization 
process of the European venture capital industry (Alhorr et al. 2008). Language, legal and cultural 
heterogeneity in different European countries do, however, still form challenges for new technology 
ventures which strive to develop beyond national boundaries in an early stage of their development 
(Lutz and George 2010). This makes it often more difficult for European ventures to build a scalable 
business model, enhancing the need for external resources and support to overcome the barriers to 
internationalization (Lutz and George 2010). Venture capital investors are hence uniquely positioned 
to help their portfolio companies, especially if they may contribute the required resources (Hallen 
2008). 
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We use a sample of 692 technology-based ventures from seven European countries that 
received initial venture capital between 1994 and 2004, and track sales in these ventures from the 
year of initial venture capital investment up to seven years after the investment. Random coefficient 
modelling is used as an appropriate longitudinal technique to model the dynamic nature of growth 
over time (Bliese and Ployhart 2002; Holcomb et al. 2010). We find broad support for our 
hypotheses. Specifically, ventures that are backed by cross-border venture capital investors initially 
grow less compared to ventures backed by domestic venture capital investors. After a couple of 
years, however, the sales growth of the former is accelerated, which implies that ventures backed by 
cross-border venture capital investors eventually grow faster compared to companies backed by 
domestic venture capital investors. The presence of at least one domestic venture capital firm 
positively moderates the relationship between the presence of cross-border venture capital investors 
and subsequent growth. We show that companies backed by a syndicate comprising both domestic 
and cross-border venture capital investors develop into the biggest sales generators. Finally, we 
provide evidence that our results remain robust when we address the multidimensional nature of 
growth by using alternative growth measures (Delmar et al. 2003) and address potential endogeneity 
concerns (Shaver 1998). 
Our research contributes to the venture capital and entrepreneurship literature. We argue 
that resource needs of ventures change over time, and show that different types of venture capital 
investors may address different resource needs. Domestic venture capital investors are better at 
supporting a venture in its early development, while the resources of a cross-border venture capital 
investor are especially valuable in a later phase when international expansion becomes more 
important. Hence, we provide a dynamic perspective on the resources venture capital investors 
provide to their portfolio companies. Furthermore, bundling diverse resources from different types 
of venture capital investors allows overcoming the shortcomings of individual investors. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical background 
and develops the hypotheses on the impact of cross-border venture capital investors on portfolio 
company growth. Section 3 describes the research method, including the sample, measures and 
method of analysis. Section 4 presents the main research findings. Finally, section 5 concludes by 
discussing the results from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. 
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2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The resource based view of the firm (RBV) defines a company as a collection of resources and 
states that the specific characteristics of the available resources significantly affect the competitive 
advantage and thereby the development of a company (Barney 1986; Barney 1991; Penrose 1958; 
Wernerfelt 1984). Companies which posses more valuable, scarce, unique and imperfectly mobile 
resources are expected to perform better and exhibit higher growth over time (Barney 1991; 
Chandler and Hanks 1994; Cooper et al. 1994). While high-tech entrepreneurial ventures are often 
based upon proprietary technological know-how, essential resources such as physical capital 
resources, human capital resources, financial capital or organizational resources may be missing 
(Heirman and Clarysse 2004; Clarysse et al. 2007; Lockett et al. 2008).  
The main challenge of an entrepreneurial firm is hence to identify and acquire a relevant 
initial resource base (Penrose 1958). While early resource based scholars deemed it important to 
acquire or develop essential resources within the boundaries of an organization, later researchers 
have shown that entrepreneurial ventures may strongly benefit from the resource base of partner 
organizations (Lee et al. 2001; De Clercq and Dimov 2008; Lockett et al. 2008).  
Venture capital investors are important by not only providing well-needed financial 
resources, but also intangible resources such as knowledge, access to networks and legitimacy 
(Sapienza 1992; Sapienza et al. 1996; Fernhaber et al. 2009). Through their monitoring and 
entrepreneurial governance activities, they are active partners in the development of their portfolio 
companies (Carpenter et al. 2003). Portfolio companies can hence spur their development through 
access to valuable intangible resources and capabilities provided by venture capital investors. We 
suggest that not all venture capital investors provide comparable resources, however. Compared 
with domestic venture capital investors, cross-border venture capital investors provide their portfolio 
companies with specific resources to grow and to develop internationally (Mäkelä and Maula 2005; 
2006). Hence, getting venture capital from cross-border investors may impact portfolio companies 
differently compared to getting venture capital from domestic investors only. We further discuss the 
impact of getting resources through cross-border venture capital investors on the growth of their 
portfolio companies. We hereby take a dynamic point of view, acknowledging that the needs of high 
technology ventures may change as they develop (Lockett et al. 2008; Vohora et al. 2004; Zahra et al. 
2006). 
Young technology-based companies face “liabilities of newness” (Stinchcombe 1965), driven 
by an incomplete resource base, including a lack of intangible resources such as organizational 
routines, networks and legitimacy in the marketplace, and an inexperienced management team 
(Stuart et al. 1999; Vohora et al. 2004). Identifying and shaping new opportunities and subsequently 
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investing in the resource base needed to pursue the opportunity are considered as the “hallmark of 
entrepreneurial capabilities” (Arthurs and Busenitz 2006: 199). Given their experience and 
involvement in multiple ventures, venture capital investors are instrumental in developing their 
portfolio companies by assisting in shaping the opportunity, acquiring essential resources and 
developing organizational capabilities (Arthurs and Busenitz 2006). We argue that domestic venture 
capital investors will be more valuable in the early development phase than cross-border venture 
capital investors and hence that portfolio companies backed by domestic venture capital investors 
will initially exhibit stronger growth compared to companies backed by cross-border venture capital 
investors. 
First, domestic venture capital investors will facilitate opportunity shaping in their portfolio 
companies to a larger extent compared to their cross-border counterparts. Challenges of early stage 
high technology companies are compounded by the fact that they often operate in complex and 
highly volatile environments (Stuart et al. 1999). This makes that the opportunities, initially identified 
in the pre-startup phase, have to be continuously tested in the market and redefined depending on 
feedback received from different parties, including potential customers. Based on newly acquired 
knowledge, they have to continuously re-assess key strategies (Arthurs and Busenitz 2006; Vohora et 
al. 2004). For example, early market feedback enables them to evaluate and reassess initial ideas, 
hereby addressing weaknesses and deficiencies in the initial offering (Vohora et al. 2004). Hence, the 
early development phase is one of continuous experimentation with the opportunity including 
product specification, market framing and defining marketing strategies. This entails a continuous 
feedback searching followed by a repackaging of opportunities, before attaining a sustainable return 
phase (Vohora et al. 2004). Improvisation and imitation are important in this phase (Zahra et al. 
2006).  
Next to clearly defining the opportunity and value creation model, the initial resource base 
has to be developed and organizational knowledge, capabilities and routines have to be shaped 
(Zahra et al. 2006; Arthurs and Busenitz 2006; Gupta and Sapienza 1992). These are necessary to 
pursue the opportunity and implement the value-creating strategy (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006). 
Given that their resources are limited at start-up, young high technology companies continuously 
identify, acquire and integrate resources in their organization and subsequently re-configure those 
during the early start-up and development phase (Arthurs and Busenitz 2006; Vohora et al. 2004). 
Critical early resource acquisition activities include purchasing materials, buying or renting facilities 
and equipment and hiring employees (Newbert 2005).  
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Spatial proximity of venture capital investors may be especially important in this early phase 
of opportunity shaping and resource acquisition (Fritsch and Schilder 2008). Venture capital investors 
are influential in these processes by providing contacts to relevant external parties for soliciting 
feedback, by critically reassessing initial ideas based on the feedback and hence by helping to shape 
the new venture’s strategy (Gupta and Sapienza 1992). Distance and investing across boundaries 
creates an information disadvantage and makes it more difficult to monitor ventures closely (Dai, Jo 
and Kassicieh, 2010). Despite increased difficulties with information gathering and monitoring, cross-
border venture capital investors have been found to devote less time to their portfolio companies 
(Sapienza et al. 1996) due to higher transaction costs (Frisch and Schilder, 2008). Fritsch and Schilder 
(2008) have furthermore shown that telecommunication technology does not substitute for local 
presence and face-to-face contacts. Finally, cross-border venture capital investors lose more quickly 
interest in their portfolio companies if they fail to develop satisfactorily (Mäkelä and Maula 2006). 
Distance hence makes that venture capital investors are less closely involved with their portfolio 
companies, which is especially detrimental in the early development stage where their input is likely 
to be especially beneficial to define the opportunity, acquire early resources and shape 
organizational routines. 
Further, domestic investors will also have a more fine-grained understanding of the legal and 
institutional environment in which early venture development takes place. As new ventures’ 
interaction with the local environment is especially important to secure important early resources, 
domestic venture capital investors are expected to be able to provide more valuable and relevant 
advice to their portfolio companies in their early development phase. In all, young high technology 
companies will benefit more from domestic venture capital investors compared to cross-border 
venture capital investors, leading to the first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Portfolio companies that raise initial finance from at least one cross-border 
venture capital investor will initially exhibit lower growth compared to companies that raise 
initial finance from domestic venture capital investors.  
 
Once the opportunity has been refined based on market feedback and initial resources have 
been put in place, high technology ventures enter a new phase in which they strive to attain 
sustainable returns through market development and revenue generation (Vohora et al. 2004). High-
tech ventures often have a narrow product scope based on a technology that may quickly become 
obsolete and for which the domestic market size is limited. Their specialized product or service base 
targeted towards niche markets forces them to internationalize rapidly to reach a minimum efficient 
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scale (Litvak 1990; McDougall et al. 1994; Coviello and Munro 1995; Knight and Cavusgil 2004; Lutz 
and George 2010). This makes that they need to have an international focus from an early stage 
(Litvak 1990; McDougall et al. 1994; Coviello and Munro 1995; Knight and Cavusgil 2004). The use of 
resources and the sale of outputs in multiple countries is hence critical for their development in this 
stage (Oviatt and McDougall 1994; Lutz and George 2010).  
Compared to operating in domestic markets, expanding internationally entails costs that 
result from the unfamiliarity faced by companies in foreign markets and from political, cultural and 
economic differences between foreign markets and the home market, causing liabilities of 
foreignness (Zaheer 1995; Dai et al. 2010). These liabilities of foreignness are especially difficult to 
overcome for young technology-based ventures, as they often miss the resources and capabilities to 
deal with international expansion (Clarysse et al. 2007; Zahra et al. 2007). Both internal employees 
and external board members with varied skills and experiences in international markets may provide 
useful connections to existing institutions, companies and networks in target foreign markets. They 
facilitate gathering, analyzing and interpreting information about opportunities in these markets 
(Zahra et al. 2007). 
It has been shown that cross-border venture capital investors also facilitate international 
development of their portfolio companies (Dai et al. 2010; Lutz and George 2010). Cross-border 
venture capital investors may limit liabilities of foreignness experienced by their portfolio companies 
in multiple ways. First, the presence of cross-border venture capital investors may provide portfolio 
companies access to complementary knowledge-based resources in the country of origin of the 
venture capital investor; these would typically be unavailable to companies that raise finance from 
domestic venture capital investors. For instance, cross-border venture capital investors may be 
particularly able to provide companies with knowledge about foreign legal and business issues 
(Mäkelä and Maula 2005).  
Second, cross-border venture capital investors may provide portfolio companies access to 
their international network, allowing companies to make contacts with relevant foreign suppliers, 
customers, financiers and other potential stakeholders (Mäkelä and Maula 2005). These relationships 
are likely to foster the international growth of portfolio companies (Yli-Renko et al. 2002). Networks 
in foreign markets may also increase the ability of portfolio companies to identify new opportunities, 
which is expected to further enhance company growth (McDougall et al. 1994; Mäkelä and Maula 
2005).  
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Finally, the mere fact of having a cross-border venture capital firm as investor may provide 
benefits in the form of endorsement (Stuart et al. 1999; Mäkelä and Maula 2005). More specifically, 
cross-border venture capital investors are likely to legitimate their portfolio companies in foreign 
markets, which is expected to benefit portfolio companies when they need to mobilize resources 
from these markets (Hursti and Maula 2007). The arguments above lead to the second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Portfolio companies that raise initial finance from at least one cross-border 
venture capital investor will exhibit higher growth in a later stage compared to companies 
that raise initial finance from domestic venture capital investors.  
 
We further propose that combining domestic with cross-border venture capital investors 
leads to strongest portfolio company development. We expect that portfolio companies financed 
through a syndicate comprising both domestic and cross-border investors will exhibit higher growth 
rates than portfolio companies that are financed through either a domestic syndicate or a stand-
alone investor.  
Partnerships between cross-border and domestic venture capital investors offer the 
opportunity to make their complementary knowledge available to the portfolio companies (Brander 
et al. 2002; Dai et al. 2010; Fritsch and Schilder 2008). Domestic venture capital investors may have a 
better knowledge of local market conditions and provide better access to local resources. As they are 
confronted with lower transaction costs, they may allocate more time to monitoring their local 
portfolio companies (Fritsch and Schilder 2008). Conversely, cross-border venture capital investors 
provide knowledge, networks and legitimacy that are particularly applicable in their foreign market. 
They may provide knowledge about foreign and legal issues (Dai et al. 2010), help in opening doors 
to foreign customers, suppliers, business partners and financiers (Lutz and George 2010; Mäkelä and 
Maula 2005), endorse the portfolio company in an international context (Stuart et al. 1999; Mäkelä 
and Maula 2005) and hence help to reduce the liabilities of foreignness (Mäkelä and Maula 2005). 
Cross-border and domestic venture capital investors thus provide complementary resources, 
increasing the resources, skills and information available for the development, monitoring and 
decision making of the portfolio companies (Jääskeläinen 2009).  
We therefore expect that portfolio companies, in which cross-border and domestic venture 
capital investors form a syndicate, outperform those in which only domestic or only cross-border 
venture capital investors invest. This leads to the third hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3: The presence of at least one domestic venture capital investor besides cross-
border venture capital investors will positively moderate the relationship between cross-
border venture capital and portfolio company growth. 
 
 
3. METHOD 
3.1. Sample and Data 
Data was collected through the VICO project, which is a multi-country project on the 
financing of entrepreneurial companies in Europe. We use part of the VICO database that contains 
longitudinal data on 761 venture capital -backed companies founded in one of seven European 
countries, including Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. The sample covers 
companies that received initial venture capital financing between 1994 and 2004. This ensures that a 
variety of investment periods were included in the sample (Gulati and Higgins 2003; Hallen 2008). All 
companies were independent at start-up (i.e., other organizations may have been minority 
shareholders, but companies were not controlled by other business organizations) and maximum 10 
years old at the time of the initial venture capital investment. Furthermore, all companies had to be 
active in high-tech industries, including aerospace, biotech, energy, ICT manufacturing, internet, 
nanotech, pharmaceutical, robotics, software, telecom, web publishing and other R&D. The dataset 
includes companies that eventually fail and hence results are not subject to survivorship bias, which 
is an important shortcoming characterising most prior research in entrepreneurial finance (Cassar 
2004).  
For each venture capital -backed company, we collected detailed yearly financial statement 
data and this from the year of investment up until seven years after the initial venture capital 
investment. Financial statement data were collected through Amadeus and country specific 
databases. We recorded key items from the financial accounts, including sales, tangible assets, 
intangible assets, total assets, cash, equity and financial debt among others. For some companies no 
sales data were available, which reduces our sample to 692 venture capital -backed companies. 
Besides detailed yearly financial statement data, we collected data on the financing rounds in each 
company. In order to obtain data on venture capital investors that provide financing we combined 
multiple data sources, including Thomson ONE, Zephyr (a database similar to Thomson ONE, but with 
a stronger European focus), country specific databases, press releases, press clippings and websites. 
The data for each venture capital investment include investment year, investment amount, venture 
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capital firm type and venture capital firm age among others. Table 1 (Panel A) provides an overview 
of the companies in the sample by company founding period, investment year, country and industry. 
 
3.2. Variable definitions 
 
3.2.1. Dependent variable 
 
We track changes in sales (measured in thousands of Euros) from the year of venture capital 
investment up to seven years after the investment (whenever data is available). The timeframe of 
our study covers the typical lifespan of venture capital investments which is between three and 
seven years. We prefer to study changes in sales for at least two reasons. First, sales is often viewed 
as the most appropriate measure of firm growth, since it applies to most firms and it is rather 
insensitive to capital intensity and degree of integration (Delmar et al. 2003). Second, in practice 
sales often plays a critical role in companies. Indeed, planning systems generally begin with sales 
targets and companies must use a wide variety of goals, including sales growth, to effectively reach 
their financial objectives (Barkham et al. 1996; Brush et al. 2000), become break-even and eventually 
reach profitability. We refrain from using accounting-based indicators of profitability, which are 
inappropriate for young technology-based companies, because most of these companies do not 
generate any profit during their first years of operations (Shane and Stuart 2002).   
 
3.2.2. Independent variables 
We construct a dummy variable equal to one when companies raise initial venture capital 
finance from at least one cross-border venture capital (CBVC) investor and zero otherwise. We define 
cross-border venture capital investors as those investors that are located in a country different from 
the country where a portfolio company was founded. Moreover, in order to be defined as cross-
border venture capital investors, investors should have no local office in the country where a 
portfolio company was founded. The cross-border venture capital investor dummy variable allows us 
to compare the growth pattern of companies that start with only domestic venture capital investors 
versus companies that start with at least one cross-border venture capital investor.  
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We also include a variable that captures whether the first investment round was syndicated 
and the syndicate included at least one domestic venture capital investor. We construct a syndication 
(SYND) dummy variable, which equals one when companies raise initial venture capital from a 
syndicate including at least one domestic investor and zero otherwise. We further calculate the 
interaction between the syndication dummy and the cross-border venture capital dummy. The 
interaction term allows us to compare the growth pattern of companies that start with syndicates 
which include only domestic venture capital investors versus companies that start with syndicates 
including cross-border investors and at least one domestic venture capital investor.1  
We focus on the initial providers of venture capital financing for a number of reasons. First, it 
is difficult to separate the influence of first-round and later-round investors (Sorensen 2007). For 
example, although later-round cross-border venture capital investors may influence subsequent 
portfolio company growth, the ability of the portfolio company to attract later round cross-border 
investors may also reflect the influence of the initial domestic investor. Second, the composition and 
identity of the initial venture capital investors is likely to have a significant impact on the identity of 
the venture capital investors that provide follow-on financing (Hallen 2008). Finally, although 
changes may occur in the composition of a syndicate over time and our approach may hence 
introduce some noise into the data, we see no way in which this additional noise biases the results in 
favour of our hypotheses.  
Table 1 (Panel B) provides an overview of our sample, where we distinguish between 
companies that raise financing from a standalone domestic investor, a cross-border investor (or 
multiple cross-border investors), a syndicate of domestic investors or a syndicate with at least one 
cross-border and one domestic investor. Two particular observations are worth noting.  
Insert Table 1 About Here 
First, cross-border venture capital investors have been active over the entire timeframe of 
our study, although most cross-border investments are concentrated during the dot-com bubble, the 
subsequent crash and the following normalization of the venture investment market. Second, while 
previous studies have stressed the importance of domestic investors in order for portfolio companies 
to raise cross-border venture capital (Mäkelä and Maula 2008), we find that cross-border investors 
                                                          
1
 Results remain robust when using the natural logarithm of the number of cross-border investors that provide 
initial financing, and the natural logarithm of the number of domestic investors in a syndicate. The use of 
dummy variables, however, fits better with the theoretical framework we have developed above. For instance, it 
may be sufficient to have one domestic venture capital firm investing together with a cross-border venture 
capital firms to diminish the information asymmetry problems experienced by the latter. This is why we 
subsequently report our results by using the dummy variables. 
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also invest on their own without domestic investors and this even in the initial venture capital 
financing round.  
Table 2 shows the origin of the cross-border investors in our sample. Most cross-border 
investors (42%) come from another Continental European country, while approximately an equal 
number come from the U.K. and Ireland on the one hand and the U.S. on the other hand. Very few 
cross- border investors originate from other countries. U.K. and Irish venture capital investors invest 
relatively more frequently without local investors compared to U.S. investors and investors from 
other Continental European countries. 
Insert Table 2 About here 
3.2.3. Control variables 
We control for venture capital firm characteristics, industry effects, year effects, country 
effects and portfolio company characteristics. Table 3 gives an overview of the control variables. For 
venture capital firm characteristics, we include VC firm age, measured as the difference between the 
investment year and founding year of the lead venture capital firm providing initial financing. This 
measure partially controls for the fact that older venture capital firms may have more experience 
and may have established a broader network in the venture capital community (Sorenson and Stuart 
2001).  
Insert Table 3 About Here 
The average lead venture capital investment firm is 14 years (median: 4 years) when 
investing in a portfolio company; cross-border investors are older (average: 24 years; median: 7 
years). We further control for the type of venture capital firm involved. Venture capital firms are 
often affiliated with other organizations and these affiliations may shape their strategies and 
objectives, and, by extension, the growth patterns of their portfolio companies. For instance, bank-
related venture capital firms may invest in companies for which they can then provide further 
financial services, including debt finance (Hellmann et al. 2008). We include four dummy variables, 
which are equal to one when the venture capital firm that provides initial financing is respectively a 
bank-related investor (17.92% of portfolio companies), corporate investor (14.31%), university-related 
investor (5.06%), government-related investor (24.57%), and zero otherwise. Independent (62.72%) 
venture capital firms serve as the reference category. 
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For portfolio company characteristics, we include portfolio company age, measured as the 
difference between the year of the initial venture capital investment and company founding year, 
since it is well-established in the organizational growth literature that age effects cause differences in 
growth patterns. Companies are on average 2.2 years (median: 1 year) when receiving a first venture 
capital investment. Portfolio companies raising venture capital from cross-border investors only are 
slightly younger (average age: 1.82 years; median 1 year). We also control for the initial amount of 
finance raised by the portfolio companies. This is important since companies that raise more finance 
are able to mobilize more strategic resources early-on, and as such these companies are likely to 
develop a competitive advantage over their resource-constrained peers (Lee et al. 2001). The mean 
venture capital amount invested is €3,324,000 (median: €910,000). Cross-border investors invest 
higher amounts (average: €8,944,000), while the highest amounts are invested by syndicates 
comprised of domestic and cross-border investors (average: €9,820,000). To control for possible 
differences in growth potential between companies, we include the intangible assets ratio, measured 
as the ratio of intangible assets to tangible assets. Prior research demonstrates that the ratio of 
intangible assets to tangible assets, as opposed to the absolute level of intangible assets, is a better 
predictor of growth potential (Villalonga 2004). The average (median) firm in the sample has 24% 
(8%) of intangible assets compared to total assets, with the highest intangible assets ratio occurring 
in firms which are financed by stand-alone domestic investors (average: 30%; median: 9%). This 
suggests that domestic venture capital investors invest in companies with higher growth potential, or 
with higher information asymmetries. 
The industries in which companies operate may significantly influence their growth patterns. 
We therefore include industry dummies in our models to control for potential industry effects. Table 
1 shows that the most important industry is the software industry (35%), followed by the biotech 
industry (17%), the ICT industry (16%) and the internet industry (13%). We also include year dummies 
for the wide variety of investment periods included in our sample, including the development of the 
venture investment market, dot-com bubble, the subsequent crash, and the following normalization 
of the venture investment market (Gulati and Higgins 2003; Hallen 2008). Such controls are 
important since companies may exhibit different growth patterns depending upon the investment 
period when they received their initial venture capital investment. We further include country 
dummies to control for potential country effects, since previous research has shown that the 
institutions and norms that structure venture capital investing exhibit significant commonalities as 
well as significant variations across countries (Sapienza et al. 1996).  
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Close to 20% of all sample firms come from the U.K. and 19% from Germany; 16% come from 
France and 14% from Italy. Spanish firms represent 11% of the sample, while Belgian and Finnish 
companies represent slightly less than 10% of all firms in the sample (see Table 1). 
There is obviously natural heterogeneity among companies in many extraneous variables 
besides our controls. Although these extraneous variables are not of any substantive interest they 
can potentially have an impact on the growth curve of companies. The strength of the longitudinal 
research design adopted in this paper is that any extraneous factors (regardless of whether they have 
been measured or not) that influence the growth of companies but whose influence is constant over 
time, are eliminated or blocked out as the size of companies is compared at several occasions 
(Fitzmaurice et al. 2004). 
 
3.3. Econometric approach  
Random Coefficient Modelling (RCM), also referred to as mixed modelling or growth 
modelling, is used as an appropriate longitudinal technique to study changes in sales over time. 
Many of the standard statistical techniques, including Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, are 
not appropriate when data consist of repeated measures that are correlated within companies as it 
invalidates the basic assumption of independence (Fitzmaurice et al. 2004). In order to deal with 
longitudinal data, scholars have often used general multivariate regression models that require 
longitudinal data where all companies have the same number of repeated measures, taken at time 
points, which are also the same for all companies (Fitzmaurice et al. 2004). These strict assumptions 
are rarely fulfilled in longitudinal studies and are not required when using a RCM framework 
(Fitzmaurice et al. 2004). Recent applications of the RCM framework in the management and 
entrepreneurship literature are available (Bliese and Ployhart 2002; Hausknecht et al. 2008; Holcomb 
et al. 2010). 
It is conceptually convenient to depict RCM as multilevel models (Fitzmaurice et al 2004). The 
multilevel perspective is most useful if one assumes that companies randomly vary in terms of their 
initial size and growth trajectory. This assumption seems reasonable for many applications in 
organizational studies. Individual profile plots (not presented) confirm significant heterogeneity in 
initial sales and the evolution of sales over time. We discuss two levels of equations. 
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The first level in the hierarchy is the individual-level model, which specifies the nature of 
change for each individual company. The simplest model of individual company change is the 
straight-line (linear) growth model: 
 
salesij = β1i + β2i tij + ei 
 
(1) 
where salesij is the ith company’s sales at the jth time point. tij is a simple count measure 
representing the successive years after the initial venture capital investment (0, 1, 2, ..., 7) which is 
used to fit a linear trend to the ith company’s data across time. β1i and β2i are the company specific 
intercept and linear coefficient respectively. The values of the βs can vary among companies. The eij 
are the residuals. Equation (1) illustrates the flexibility of the RCM framework. Each company can 
have a different number of time points, data of each company may be measured at different times 
and each company can have a different growth trajectory (Fitzmaurice et al. 2004). RCM can also 
accommodate non-linear change. The simplest non-linear model is a quadratic model, which is 
specified by adding β3i tij² to equation (1): 
 
salesij = β1i + β2i tij + β3i tij² + eij (2) 
 
The second level in the hierarchy are the group-level models. Though the above individual 
regression equations are informative, researchers are usually interested in group effects. 
Conceptually, the random change parameters from the individual-level model (e.g. β1i, β2i and β3i or 
company specific intercept, linear coefficient and quadratic coefficient respectively) are treated as 
response variables in a second set of models. Considering the equation (2) quadratic individual 
change model, the group level equations are: 
 
β1i = β1 + b1i   (3) 
β2i = β2 + b2i   (4) 
β3i = β3 + b3i   (5) 
 
where β1, β2 and β3 are the fixed intercepts in the level 2 equations and thus the averages of 
the individual-level parameters. β1, β2 and β3 indicate the nature of change for the group as a whole, 
where β1 is the group mean intercept or mean initial sales, β2 is the group mean linear change and β3 
is the group mean quadratic change or curvature. The β’s are fixed effects, because they do not vary 
among companies. b1i, b2i and b3i are the level 2 residual terms reflecting individual company 
differences from the fixed effects. 
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An extension of the unconditional RCM discussed above is to incorporate predictors of 
change. The key predictors of change in this paper are the cross-border venture capital variable, the 
syndication variable and their interaction. These variables are all measured at the time of the initial 
investment. We examine whether the individual change parameters (β1i, β2i and β3i) vary as a 
function of cross-border venture capital involvement, syndication and their interaction. These 
predictors of change are static covariates which are incorporated in the group-level equations. 
Consider the individual-level quadratic change model (2) above. The group level equations studying 
change conditional on syndication, cross-border venture capital involvement and their interaction 
then become:  
 
β1i = β1 + β4 CBVCi + β5 SYNDi + β6 CBVCi x SYNDi + b1i   (6) 
β2i = β2 + β7 CBVCi + β8 SYNDi + β9 CBVCi x SYNDi + b2i   (7) 
β3i = β3 + β10 CBVCi + β11 SYNDi + β12 CBVCi x SYNDi + b3i   (8) 
 
where CBVCi indicates whether cross-border venture capital was raised, SYNDi indicates 
whether the first investment was syndicated with at least one domestic investor, and SYNDi*CBVCi is 
the interaction term measured at the time of the initial venture capital investment for the i-th 
company. β4 is the relationship between cross-border venture capital and intercept or initial sales, β7 
is the relationship between cross-border venture capital and linear change in sales and β10 is the 
relationship between cross-border venture capital and quadratic change in sales. β4 is the cross-
border venture capital by intercept interaction and shows how the mean initial sales of companies is 
dependent upon the receipt of cross-border venture capital. β7 is the cross-border venture capital by 
linear trend interaction and indicates how the mean linear trend in sales is dependent upon the 
receipt of cross-border venture capital. β10 is the cross-border venture capital by quadratic trend 
interaction and indicates how curvature is dependent upon the receipt of cross-border venture 
capital. Similar interpretations hold for coefficients relating to the syndication dummy and the 
interaction term.  
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4. RESULTS 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics on sales from the year of investment up to seven years 
after the initial venture capital investment. It confirms that the average venture capital -backed 
company in our sample demonstrates significant sales growth over time. The large difference 
between mean and median sales indicates the distribution of sales is skewed towards the higher 
sales values. We use the natural logarithm of sales in all subsequent analyses, which has the 
advantage that it functions as a normalizing transformation and decreases the probability that 
extreme observations will drive our findings (Hand 2005). 
Insert Table 4 About here 
Table 4 further indicates the sample size for sales at various points in time. Traditional 
longitudinal techniques require either complete data or assume data are missing completely at 
random (MCAR). MCAR implies that an unconditional random process, like a random number 
generator, is responsible for the missing data. A major advantage of the RCM framework is that 
under the assumption of missing at random (MAR), missing data can be accommodated (Long et al. 
2009). MAR is less strict than MCAR and implies that a conditional random process was responsible 
for the missing data. The conditioning is assumed to be on another variable. In this study, the bulk of 
missing sales data at the end of the timeframe are due to the recent time when companies received 
initial venture capital. For instance, when a company received initial venture capital in 2004, 
accounting data is simply unavailable for seven years after the initial investment. MAR still yields 
unbiased estimates when using the RCM framework as long as the proper conditioning variables are 
included in the analysis, which is the case in our study as we control for the investment year.2  
 
  
                                                          
2
 We also have missing data because companies failed. Failed companies were those that ceased to operate over 
the timeframe of the study. We decided not to eliminate data of these failed companies altogether, since this 
would introduce survivorship bias (Cassar 2004). Rather, we used as much of the data that is available on failed 
companies and include observations for the years failed companies operated. As a robustness check, we included 
the failed companies with zero sales for each year in which they could have had sales if they had lived (see 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990). This procedure provided similar results compared to those described below. 
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4.2. Model Development 
Any longitudinal study should start with fitting unconditional models, which do not 
incorporate predictors of change (Singer and Willet 2003). These models provide insights into the 
pattern of change in the entire sample of venture capital backed companies, which is critical in order 
to be able to answer questions about the effects of particular covariates on this growth pattern. The 
results of the unconditional analyses are shown in Table 5. Model 1 reports the means model or no 
change model, which will serve as the baseline model in other to determine whether more complex 
growth models are needed.  
Insert Table 5 About Here 
Model 2 reports the linear growth model, in which a linear time predictor is introduced to 
the means model. Model 3 reports the quadratic growth model, in which the quadratic time 
predictor is added to the linear model. 
Successively more complex growth models were evaluated for improvement in model fit 
over the baseline model using the -2 log-likelihood statistic (-2LL) based on the chi-square 
distribution (Bliese and Ployhart 2002). The -2LL value associated with the more complex model is 
subtracted from the -2LL value associated with the more parsimonious model and the difference is 
tested for statistical significance using a chi-square test. When comparing the means model (model 
1) with the linear model (model 2) the difference is distributed as chi-squared with df = 3. Since χ²(3, 
α = 0.05) = 7.815 and the difference in -2LL equals 1118 (=12348-11230), we find that the linear 
models fit the data significantly better compared to the constant models. When comparing the linear 
model (model 2) with the quadratic model (model 3) the difference is distributed as chi-squared with 
df = 4. Since χ²(4, α = 0.05) = 9.488. The difference in -2LL equals 165 (=11230-11065), implying that 
the quadratic models have a significantly better fit compared to the linear models. Hence, the 
quadratic change models provide the best fit, and we discuss this model in more detail below. 
The quadratic change model allows the modelling of curvilinear change in sales. The fixed 
effects estimate initial sales, instantaneous rate of change in sales and curvature, a parameter that 
describes a changing growth rate of sales over time. Model 3 indicates, unsurprisingly, that the 
average venture capital-backed company has positive non-zero sales (5.5369; p < .001) in the year of 
the initial venture capital investment. Because the instantaneous rate of change is positive, sales 
grow by .5906 (p < .001) in the first year after venture capital investment. But the negative curvature 
(-.0525; p < .001) indicates that this growth does not persist: with each passing year, the magnitude 
of the growth in sales diminishes. In the next section further complexity to the unconditional 
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quadratic growth models is introduced by including the controlled effect of the presence of at least 
one cross-border investor and syndication with domestic investors on sales growth in venture 
capital-backed companies. This allows testing the hypotheses. 
 
4.3. Hypothesis Tests 
Table 6 evaluates the controlled effect of receiving first round venture capital financing from 
cross-border venture capital investors and from syndicates with at least one domestic investor on the 
growth pattern of venture capital -backed companies.  
Insert Table 6 About Here 
In Model 4 we control for the age of the lead venture capital firm at the time of investment, 
venture capital firm types involved in the initial investment, industry effects, country effects, year 
effects and portfolio company age. In Model 5 an additional control is included for the investment 
amount provided by the first round investors. In Model 6 we further include the relative amount of 
intangible assets at time of the first investment to control for difference in growth potential between 
companies. Note that adding these additional controls to our models reduces the sample size due to 
data unavailability. The results of the three conditional RCM models are qualitatively similar. We 
therefore focus our subsequent discussion on the most complete model (Model 6). 
The growth pattern of sales is summarized in three parameters, more specifically initial size, 
instantaneous rate of change (linear growth) and curvature (quadratic growth). We fail to find an 
effect of cross-border venture capital, syndication with domestic investors and their interaction on 
the initial sales level in venture capital-backed companies. This suggests that the initial size of the 
portfolio company is not related to the probability of being funded by either cross-border or 
domestic investors. 
Receiving initial finance from at least one cross-border venture capital investor significantly 
affects the sales growth trajectories of portfolio companies. Specifically, companies backed by cross-
border venture capital investors exhibit a significantly lower instantaneous growth rate (-.4968; p < 
.01) compared to portfolio companies backed by domestic venture capital investors. This provides 
support for our first hypothesis: companies backed by cross-border venture capital investors initially 
exhibit lower sales growth compared to companies that raise initial finance from domestic venture 
capital investors. 
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Although companies backed by cross-border venture capital investors have a lower 
instantaneous growth rate, curvature is significantly higher and positive (.0754; p < .01). This 
indicates that although sales initially increase at a higher rate in companies backed by domestic 
investors, sales growth diminishes more quickly over time in companies backed by domestic 
investors compared to companies backed by cross-border investors. This implies that as time 
proceeds the growth rate of companies backed by cross-border investors will exceed the growth rate 
of companies backed by domestic investors. This provides support for our second hypothesis: 
companies backed by cross-border venture capital investors exhibit higher growth in later stages 
compared to companies that raise initial finance from domestic venture capital investors. A further 
analysis of the evolution of sales in companies backed by a standalone domestic investor and 
companies backed by a cross-border investor (or a syndicate comprising only cross-border investors) 
shows that the shift in growth rates between these two groups of companies is located within the 
timeframe of our study. Specifically, while the growth rate of the average company backed by a 
standalone domestic investor equals .87 one year after the investment, it equals .24 four years after 
the investment. The growth rate of the average company backed by one or multiple cross-border 
investors equals .23 one year after the investment, while it equals .28 four year after the investment. 
Differences between growth rates of the average companies backed by standalone domestic or 
cross-border investors become even more pronounced in subsequent years. This provides additional 
supporting evidence for our second hypothesis. Figure 1 summarises these distinct effects 
graphically3. It shows that the mean company, backed by cross-border venture capital investors, 
develops initially more slowly after investment than the mean company, backed by domestic venture 
capital investors. At the end of the observation period, sales of companies backed by cross-border 
venture capital investors fully catch up with those of companies backed by domestic venture capital 
investors. Interestingly, the sales growth of companies backed by cross-border venture capital 
investors is still significantly positive seven years after investment (which corresponds with the end 
of the observation period), while it is significantly negative for companies backed by domestic 
venture capital investors. This suggests that cross-border investors are more beneficial in the long 
run compared to domestic investors, even if the initial development of their portfolio companies is 
slower in the early years after the investment. 
  
                                                          
3
 Note that we do not graph the evolution of the natural logarithm of sales, but prefer to graph the evolution of 
sales, for ease of interpretation. 
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The interaction term between the presence of cross-border investors and syndication with 
domestic investors demonstrates that portfolio companies initially backed by syndicates including 
both cross-border and domestic venture capital investors show a significantly higher instantaneous 
rate of change (.5234; p < .05). We find evidence that syndication with domestic investors benefits 
the growth of companies backed by cross-border investors compared to companies that are only 
backed by cross-border venture capital investors. Nevertheless, curvature is negative in companies 
backed by cross-border investors and at least one domestic investors (-.0689; p < .05), which entails 
that curvature is similar between companies backed by cross-border investors and at least one 
domestic investors and companies that raise finance from domestic investors only.  
Figure 1 demonstrates that although companies backed by a syndicate comprising cross-
border and domestic investors have similar sales compared to other venture capital backed 
companies, they develop into the biggest sales generators by the end of the timeframe of our study. 
It provides support for hypothesis 3: a syndicate comprising domestic and cross-border venture 
capital investors positively moderates the relationship between the presence of cross-border venture 
capital investors and sales growth. Sales of companies, backed by a syndicate comprised of domestic 
and cross-border venture capital investors are higher than those of other companies during the 
whole observation period. 
 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
4.4. Robustness Tests 
We fitted several additional models to test for the robustness of our findings and assess the 
strength of alternative explanations. We focus on two specific concerns. First, although sales is 
typically considered to be the most appropriate growth measure and sales is the preferred growth 
measure by entrepreneurs themselves, growth is considered to be multidimensional in nature 
(Delmar et al. 2003). Second, it is important to consider potential endogeneity concerns. Indeed, our 
results may be attributable to matching on the basis of unobservable characteristics (Shaver 1998). 
More specifically, cross-border (domestic) venture capital firms may select companies with different 
growth potential, or alternatively companies with different growth potential may select cross-border 
(domestic) venture capital firms (Eckhardt et al. 2006).4 
                                                          
4
 The additional models are not reported in detail due to space considerations, but they are available from the 
authors upon simple request. 
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We address the multidimensional nature of company growth by studying change in 
alternative growth measures. First, we reran all models with the natural logarithm of total assets as 
our dependent variable. Results are qualitatively similar, and even stronger, when using the natural 
logarithm of total assets as the dependent variable. Specifically, companies backed by cross-border 
investors exhibit lower instantaneous growth rates in total assets compared to companies backed by 
domestic investors. But companies backed by cross-border investors have higher curvature 
compared to companies backed by domestic investors. When domestic investors and cross-border 
investors provide initial finance, instantaneous growth rates are higher compared to cases where 
only cross-border investors provide initial finance. Different from the models with the natural 
logarithm of sales as the dependent variable is that curvature is similar between companies backed 
by only cross-border investors or a syndicate comprising cross-border and domestic investors. This 
implies that for both groups curvature is significantly higher compared to companies backed by only 
domestic investors. Using total assets as an alternative growth measure hence provides strong 
support for our three hypotheses.  
Second, we reran all models with the natural logarithm of wages paid as our dependent 
variable. This measure reflects both the number of employees and quality of employees, when 
assuming that employees with more human capital will be more expensive (Medoff and Abraham 
1980). Results remain qualitatively similar. We find support for our first two hypotheses. When 
companies initially raise finance from cross-border investors instantaneous growth rates are lower, 
but curvature is higher. We find only weak evidence for our third hypothesis, however. Overall, our 
results are largely robust when using different growth measure, but call for more research on the 
complex interaction between different growth measures. 
We also performed three tests in an effort to assess potential endogeneity concerns 
empirically. First, we included an additional control for differences in the growth potential between 
companies in our main results presented in Table 6. When including the ratio of intangible assets on 
total assets in Model 6 results remained remarkably stable compared to the other models, despite a 
significant reduction in sample size. Moreover, all models fail to find an association between the 
initial level of sales and the receipt of cross-border venture capital. Differences between companies 
backed by cross-border investors and domestic investors only emerge in the years following the 
initial investment.  
Second, we collected data on a subsample of companies for which we have data available 
from two to one year before the initial venture capital investment was made. We split our sample in 
companies backed by a standalone domestic investor, a standalone cross-border investor (or a 
syndicate comprising only cross-border investors), a syndicate of domestic investors and a syndicate 
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comprising cross-border and domestic investors. We did not find systematic differences in growth 
rates from two to one year before the venture capital investment between companies in the 
different groups. This implies that cross-border (domestic) venture capital investors do not 
necessarily select companies with higher growth rates pre-investment.  
Third, we collected data on the exits realized in the group of companies backed by a 
standalone domestic investor, a standalone cross-border investor (or a syndicate comprising only 
cross-border investors), a syndicate of domestic investors and a syndicate comprising cross-border 
and domestic investors. The proportion of failures in each group is relatively similar, with failure 
rates somewhat higher in the companies backed by cross-border venture capital investors. This 
indicates that cross-border venture capital investors (whether they invest alone or in a syndicate with 
a domestic investor) do not necessarily have access to the best entrepreneurial companies. Overall, 
these additional tests together indicate that it is unlikely that selection is entirely driving our results. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
While it has been widely acknowledged that venture capital investors have on average a 
positive contribution on the development of their portfolio companies, evidence is increasing that 
not all venture capital is the same. This paper contributes to this stream of research by 
differentiating between portfolio companies backed by domestic and cross-border venture capital 
investors. While previous studies indicate that cross-border venture capital is an increasingly 
important phenomenon, especially for high-tech companies with high growth potential (Mäkelä and 
Maula 2008), there is little evidence on the impact of cross-border investments on the economic 
development of the portfolio companies. Based upon a sample of 692 young high technology 
companies from seven European countries and using a longitudinal research strategy, we have 
shown that companies backed by cross-border venture capital investors grow initially at a lower rate 
than companies backed by domestic venture capital investors. In later years, companies backed by 
cross-border venture capital investors exhibit higher growth rates, however. Companies backed by a 
syndicate comprised of domestic and cross-border venture capital investors develop more strongly, 
both in the short and in the long run, than other venture capital backed companies. 
Our findings suggest that proximity and knowledge of the local institutional and legal 
environmental are important for venture capital investors investing in early phases of company 
development. Domestic venture capital investors are better equipped than cross-border investors to 
overcome information asymmetries and to provide the resources relevant in the early development 
phase. Refining the opportunity and building the early resource base is important in this phase, and 
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domestic venture capital investors are better equipped to provide support in these matters. Cross-
border investors, on the other hand, have a better knowledge of external markets and are able to 
provide legitimacy to the entrepreneurial firm in international markets. These resources are 
especially beneficial for more developed firms. Our findings hence provide further support for the 
view that external parties may provide important resources to support the growth of entrepreneurial 
companies, but not all parties provide the same resources. Portfolio companies exhibit strongest 
growth when combining local knowledge and support provided by domestic investors with 
international knowledge and legitimization provided by cross-border investors. We hence provide 
further evidence of the complimentary resources that investors may bring to a heterogeneous 
venture capital syndicate (Dai et al. 2010).  
The finding that companies, backed by heterogeneous syndicates comprised of both 
domestic and cross-border investors, is interesting. It shows that both types of partners play a 
complementary role from an early stage onwards. While the internationalization resources provided 
by cross-border investors constrain early company growth when no domestic investors are present, 
these resources enhance company growth when complemented by those provided by domestic 
investors. This might reflect that portfolio companies implement internationalization routines in an 
early development phase, which may be further exploited in a later stage when internationalization 
becomes important. This is consistent with the imprinting view, suggesting that early routines have a 
long-lasting effect on company development. Combining the complementary resources of domestic 
and cross-border investors is hence relevant from an initial development stage. 
Our study is important, as few studies have disentangled the effects of domestic and cross-
border venture capital investors on their portfolio companies. Most studies on the effects of venture 
capital have studied performance at the venture capital firm or fund level, focusing on portfolio 
company exit and/or survival, or focusing on post-IPO performance (limiting these studies to the 
most successful portfolio companies). Our study, in contrast, is one of the first to focus on the 
development of the portfolio company. This is important for entrepreneurs, as the goals of investors 
and entrepreneurs are not always aligned. Understanding how portfolio companies develop after 
having received venture capital, and how different types of investors contribute differently to firm 
development, is hence relevant.  
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The longitudinal analysis in this study offers an important methodological contribution to 
growth research, which typically measures growth as the difference in size between two points in 
time, thereby ignoring development in-between (and outside) these two points (Weinzimmer et al. 
1998; Delmar et al. 2003). Our study demonstrates how different conclusions may be drawn when 
using different timeframes. For instance, studies focusing on the short-term would have a tendency 
to conclude that cross-border venture capital is associated with lower growth as the instantaneous 
growth rate in sales is lower in companies backed by only cross-border investors. Yet, long-term 
studies would have a tendency to conclude that cross-border venture capital is associated with 
higher growth as the growth rates of companies backed by at least one cross-border investor 
increases more strongly over time. This study provides a further call for research that takes 
advantage of recent developments in longitudinal data analysis to study the dynamic nature of 
growth over time. 
As with all research, this study also has limitations. First, we differentiate companies based 
on the first investment round venture capital investor characteristics, ignoring investors that may 
invest in a later investment round. This provides important avenues for future research. For instance, 
is there a different impact of syndication composition in a first round of finance versus subsequent 
rounds of finance? Second, cross-border investors may differ from domestic investors in both their 
selection behavior and their involvement in portfolio companies after the investment. While we have 
provided descriptive evidence that neither cross-border nor domestic investors have a tendency to 
select companies that exhibit significant growth before the investment, different types of investors 
may still select portfolio companies on the basis of unobservable characteristics (Dai et al. 2010). 
However, the main purpose of this study was to gain an insight into how the presence of a cross-
border investor influences the growth of portfolio companies. Whether these differences are due to 
selection or value adding is another question which warrants further study.  
Despite its limitations, the study provides valuable insights to high-tech entrepreneurs. Given 
the difficulty to raise finance from outside investors, high-tech entrepreneurs are under pressure to 
accept finance when and where they can find it. Yet, as we have demonstrated, early finance 
decisions may have a long-lasting impact on subsequent company growth. While portfolio companies 
of domestic investors are more likely to exhibit high growth early-on, companies backed by cross-
border venture capital investors have more sustainable growth rates in the long run, and especially 
so if domestic venture capital firms co-invest with cross-border venture capital firms. Overall, our 
findings suggest that it might be worthwhile for entrepreneurs to extend their search for finance and 
target a broad and diverse investor base. Our study has also important implications for public policy 
makers. Public policy programs that aim to develop a strong local venture capital industry in order to 
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foster the development of local entrepreneurial companies should recognize that stimulating cross-
border investments is a beneficial strategy. This not only increases the pool of financial capital 
available for entrepreneurial companies, but also provides complementary resources that help them 
to develop and grow more strongly. 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE  
  PANEL A PANEL B 
  
Total sample 
Domestic 
standalone 
Domestic 
syndicated 
CBVC 
CBVC- Domestic 
syndicated 
  Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Foundation period 
1984-1989 21 3.0 19 4.3 1 0.7 0 0.0 1 1.4 
1990-1994 87 12.6 61 13.9 15 10.2 4 12.1 7 9.7 
1995-1999 313 45.2 195 44.3 69 46.9 14 42.4 35 48.6 
2000-2004 271 39.2 165 37.5 62 42.2 15 45.5 29 40.3 
Year first investment  
1994 11 1.6 10 2.3 0 0.0 1 3.0 0 0.0 
1995 16 2.3 15 3.4 1 0.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 
1996 27 3.9 21 4.8 2 1.4 2 6.1 2 2.8 
1997 47 6.8 42 9.5 3 2.0 2 6.1 0 0.0 
1998 48 6.9 33 7.5 9 6.1 2 6.1 4 5.6 
1999 68 9.8 38 8.6 21 14.3 3 9.1 6 8.3 
2000 177 25.6 104 23.6 37 25.2 9 27.3 27 37.5 
2001 114 16.5 65 14.8 25 17.0 9 27.3 15 20.8 
2002 67 9.7 41 9.3 16 10.9 4 12.1 6 8.3 
2003 59 8.5 38 8.6 16 10.9 0 0.0 5 6.9 
2004 58 8.4 33 7.5 17 11.6 1 3.0 7 9.7 
Country 
Belgium 65 9.4 42 9.5 14 9.5 1 3.0 8 11.1 
Finland 68 9.8 59 13.4 4 2.7 0 0.0 5 6.9 
France 109 15.8 40 9.1 60 40.8 0 0.0 9 12.5 
Germany 134 19.4 81 18.4 18 12.2 14 42.4 21 29.2 
Italy 97 14.0 71 16.1 10 6.8 11 33.3 5 6.9 
Spain 82 11.8 72 16.4 9 6.1 0 0.0 1 1.4 
UK 137 19.8 75 17.0 32 21.8 7 21.2 23 31.9 
Industry 
Biotech 115 16.6 69 15.7 26 17.7 4 12.1 16 22.2 
Energy 2 0.3 0 0.0 2 1.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 
ICT 
manufacturing 
110 15.9 71 16.1 29 19.7 2 6.1 8 11.1 
Internet 93 13.4 59 13.4 11 7.5 10 30.3 13 18.1 
Other R&D 22 3.2 17 3.9 4 2.7 0 0.0 1 1.4 
Pharmaceutical 24 3.5 16 3.6 5 3.4 1 3.0 2 2.8 
Robotics 15 2.2 13 3.0 2 1.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Software 239 34.5 152 34.5 51 34.7 12 36.4 24 33.3 
TLC 40 5.8 21 4.8 11 7.5 4 12.1 4 5.6 
Web publishing 32 4.6 22 5.0 6 4.1 0 0.0 4 5.6 
  
692 100.0 440 100.0 147 100.0 33 100.0 72 100.0 Total 
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TABLE 2: ORIGIN OF CROSS-BORDER VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTORS  
 Total sample 
Standalone CBVC (or 
syndicate of CBVC) 
CBVC- Domestic 
syndicated 
  Number % Number % Number % 
CBVC from North 
America 
34 27.64 7 19.44 27 31.40 
CBVC from UK and 
Ireland 
32 26.02 13 36.11 19 22.09 
CBVC from Continental 
EU 
52 42.28 14 38.89 37 43.02 
CBVC from other 5 4.07 2 5.56 3 3.49 
Total 123 100.00 36 100.00 86 100.00 
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TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF CONTROL VARIABLES  
  
  
Venture capital 
firm age 
Portfolio 
company age 
Initial amount 
of finance (x 
€1.OOO) 
Intangible asset 
ratio 
Total sample 
Mean 13.77 2.29 3324.05 24.26% 
Median  4.00 1.00 910.00 8.26% 
SD 49.91 2.70 8748.40 139.71% 
N 692 692 531 496 
Domestic 
standalone 
Mean 13.82 2.34 1442.90 29.99% 
Median  4.00 1.00 475.50 8.75% 
SD 60.90 2.77 2590.70 172.84% 
N 440 440 328 322 
Domestic 
syndicated 
Mean 10.74 2.32 4272.00 15.39% 
Median  5.00 1.00 2030.99 10.09% 
SD 14.57 2.62 8951.19 16.58% 
N 147 147 123 111 
CBVC 
Mean 23.67 1.82 8944.38 10.27% 
Median  6.00 1.00 3250.00 4.61% 
SD 30.62 2.47 17176.27 13.00% 
N 33 33 22 18 
CBVC - Domestic 
syndicated 
Mean 15.05 2.15 9820.11 10.67% 
Median  7.00 1.00 4023.12 6.09% 
SD 19.61 2.53 17762.70 13.95% 
N 72 72 58 45 
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TABLE 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SALES (IN 000 EUR)A 
 Time 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
                  Mean 2161.1
5 
2685.9
1 
3314.4
7 
4680.29 5695.20 7440.91 9629.89 11746.9
7 
Median 421.00 699.49 875.50 1123.63 1597.50 1853.16 2297.50 2513.00 
Std. 
Deviation 
8094.2
3 
7457.8
1 
8248.7
1 
12628.7
4 
14282.5
6 
18719.6
6 
30794.0
0 
42455.7
5 
N 429 505 524 482 448 365 312 226 
                  a Time is a simple count measure representing successive years where zero equals the year of the 
initial venture capital investment. 
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TABLE 5: UNCONDITIONAL RCM WITH THE NATURAL LOGARITHM OF SALES AS THE 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
              Initial Size 6.6071 *** 5.8573 *** 5.5369 *** 
  (0.0741)   (0.0811)   (0.0849)   
              
Instantanious rate of 
change 
    0.2647 *** 0.5906 *** 
      (0.0168)   (0.0299)   
              
Curvature         -0.0525 *** 
          (0.0040)   
              
              -2LL 12348 11230 11065 
Number of observations 3291 3291 3291 
Where † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 and *** p < 0.001 (Conservative two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 6: CONDITIONAL RCM WITH THE NATURAL LOGARITHM OF SALES AS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
    Model 4 a Model 5 b Model 6 c 
                Initial Size Intercept 4.7145 **
* 
1.7116 ** 2.0463 **
* 
    (0.294
3) 
  (0.521
2) 
  (0.578
7) 
  
  Cross-Border VC 0.5069   -
0.1722 
  -
0.2962 
  
    (0.355
5) 
  (0.439
9) 
  (0.526
3) 
  
  Syndication 0.1702   -
0.1428 
  -
0.2038 
  
    (0.223
2) 
  (0.252
4) 
  (0.271
2) 
  
  Cross-Border VC x 
Syndication 
0.1443   .054    . 514   
    (0.452
4) 
  (0.527
7) 
  (0.628
9) 
  
                
Instantaneous rate of 
change 
Intercept 0.7627 **
* 
0.8331 **
* 
0.8681 **
* 
    (0.118
4) 
  (0.205
5) 
  (0.220
8) 
  
  Cross-Border VC -
0.4370 
* -
0.5008 
* -
0.4968 
* 
    (0.137
7) 
  (0.167
8) 
  (0.188
1) 
  
  Syndication -
0.0547 
  -
0.1036 
  -
0.0738 
  
    (0.090
1) 
  (0.103
5) 
  (0.109
1) 
  
  Cross-Border VC x 
Syndication 
.2794   .5124 * .52 4 * 
    (0.180
7) 
  (0.210
3) 
  (0.236
0) 
  
                
Curvature Intercept -
0.0695 
**
* 
-
0.0496 
† -
0.0511 
† 
    (0.015
6) 
  (0,026
9) 
  (0,028
9) 
  
  Cross-Border VC . 01 * . 730 ** . 754 ** 
    (0.018
8) 
  (0.022
4) 
  (0.024
2) 
  
  Syndication 0.0109   0.0215   0.0213   
    (0.012
3) 
  (0.014
2) 
  (0.015
2) 
  
  Cross-Border VC x 
Syndication 
-
0.0435 
† -
0.0697 
* -
0.0689 
* 
    (0.024
8) 
  (0.028
4) 
  (0.031
1) 
  
                
                  -2LL 10595.
7 
  8543.6   7683.1   
  Number of observations 3291   2639   2379   
a Includes the following control variables (not presented due to space considerations): industry 
dummies, country dummies ,year dummies, lead venture capital firm age, venture capital firm type 
and portfolio company age. 
b Includes the following control variables (not presented due to space considerations): control 
variables of Model 4 and initial investment size. 
c Includes the following control variables (not presented due to space considerations): control 
variables of Model 5 and intangible assets ratio. 
Where † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 and *** p < 0.001 (Conservative two-tailed tests). 
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FIGURE 1: PREDICTED GROWTH CURVES FOR PORTFOLIO COMPANY SALES (IN 000 EUR)  
 
 
